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Abstract
We examine asset prices in a representative-agent model of general
equilibrium. Assuming only that individuals are risk averse, we determine
conditions on the changes in asset risk that are both necessary and sufficient
for the asset price to fall. We show that these conditions neither imply, nor
are implied by the conditions for second-degree stochastic dominance. For
example, if the payoff on an asset becomes riskier in the sense of second-
degree stochastic dominance, the equilibrium price of the asset need not
necessarily fall. We further demonstrate how our results can be imbedded
into a market that is incomplete in the sense of containing an uninsurable
background risk, such as a risk on labor income. We extend our model to
show how a miscalibration of the asset risk can lead to a partial explanation
of high equity premia (i.e., the "equity premium puzzle").
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Understanding the mechanism of asset pricing has long been a goal of financial 
economists.  One approach is the so-called representative agent model, as put forth by 
Lucas (1978), which has since established itself as a major part of both the 
macroeconomic theory and the microeconomic theory of security returns.  For instance, 
the model has been used extensively in examining such vexing empirical anomalies as 
the equity-premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott (1985)).1  A key result of the 
representative-agent model is that the price of an asset equals the expected value of that 
asset under a transformed probability distribution, the risk-neutral probability 
distribution.2  This basic paradigm of "risk-neutral pricing" has imbedded itself 
throughout the financial literature and is at the foundation of many complex theories. 
  Our goal in this paper is to examine the effect of a change in the actual 
distribution of an asset's payoffs on its price, i.e. on its risk-neutral expectation.  For 
example, if the payoff on an asset becomes riskier in the sense of second-degree 
stochastic dominance, will the price of the asset necessarily fall?  The surprising answer 
(at least to some) is "no."  Although the individual agents will all have a lower certainty 
equivalent for replacing the riskier asset, assuming they are risk averse, risk-neutral 
pricing looks only at the marginal valuation of the asset.  At equilibrium prices, the 
individual is indifferent to buying or selling more of the asset, not indifferent to replacing 
his or her asset position with certainty.  The problem, then, is more closely related to the 
standard portfolio problem under an increase in risk.3  Indeed, our model essentially takes 
                                                            
1See Kocherlakota (1996) for excellent discussion of the background of the representative-agent 
approach vis a vis its alternatives, such as the CAPM.  Kocherlakota also presents a broad 
survey of the empirical successes and failures of this approach in addressing both the equity-
premium puzzle and the risk-free-rate puzzle (Weil (1989)). 
2See Rubinstein (1976) for the development of the risk-neutral approach. 
3See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) for an original statement of the problem.  See also a nice 
restatement and extension by Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) and by Hadar and Seo (1990).  2 
the portfolio problem -- how much to invest in a risky asset at a given price -- and imbeds 
it into a general equilibrium model of prices in an exchange economy. 
  Unlike Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), Diamond and Stiglitz (1974), Labadie 
(1986), Hadar and Seo (1990) and others, we do not focus on restrictions on preferences 
which will cause mean-preserving spreads to reduce demand for a risky asset.  Rather, we 
focus on changes in risk that will induce all risk averters to demand less of the asset.  
Although one cannot assume, in general, that asset demand is downward sloping, it turns 
out always to be downward sloping at the market-clearing price, which therefore is 
unique.  Assuming only that individuals are risk averse, we determine conditions on the 
changes in asset risk that are both necessary and sufficient for the asset price to fall.  We 
show that these conditions neither imply, nor are implied by the conditions for second-
degree stochastic dominance.  We provide a set of extent conditions for changes in asset 
risk that are sufficient to lower the equilibrium asset price.  
  We next demonstrate how our results can be imbedded into a market that is 
incomplete in the sense of containing an uninsurable background risk, such as a risk on 
labor income.  Weil (1992) uses such a model in a two-period setting to address the 
equity-premium puzzle.  We illustrate Weil's main result in our simple static model and 
we extend the model to show how a miscalibration of the asset risk also can lead to a 
partial explanation for high equity premia, if the miscalibration error takes the form of 
white noise.   
  Before proceeding, we wish to make two caveats.  First, our model considers a 
single risky asset, which might best be viewed as the "market portfolio" for the given 
economy.  Thus, we essentially consider two economies, identical in every way except 
for the riskiness of the market portfolio in each.  This is not the same as comparing the 
prices of two assets within a single economy.  In this context, our paper considers 
whether or not there is a monotonic relationship between the riskiness of the market 
portfolio and its expected return.  3 
  As a second caveat, we forewarn the reader that ours is a static model.  Certainly 
there are dynamic features of exchange economies that need to be taken into account if 
one expects to develop a full positive theory of asset pricing.  However, an understanding 
of something as basic as how risk affects asset prices would appear to be of fundamental 
importance.  All of the effects we examine here become even more complex within a 
more general intertemporal setting.4   In this regard, ours might best be viewed as a 
negative result:  there need not be a risk-versus-return tradeoff in equilibrium.  Of course, 
if this tradeoff cannot be guaranteed in our simple static model, it obviously must not 
hold when our model is embedded into a more realistic setting.  And although one can 
correctly argue that the sufficient condition presented in our Proposition below might not 
remain sufficient in a more general setting, our necessary condition for a change in asset 
risk to guarantee a reduction in the asset's price will remain necessary. 
 
 
2.  Equilibrium Prices  
 
  We consider a static Lucas (1978) "tree economy."  The economy consists of risk-
averse individuals, all of whom may be portrayed by a "representative agent.”5  T h e  
economy is competitive in that individuals maximize expected utility with prices taken as 
given. 
  Initial wealth consists of one unit of the risky asset plus an allocation of a risk-
free asset.  Because our model is static, the risk-free rate in our model can be thought of 
in essence as zero.  We let w > 0 denote the value of wealth that is initially invested in 
                                                            
4However, if the risk-free rate is zero, consumers behaving myopically is intertemporally efficient 
when utility belongs to the HARA class (Mossin (1968)); and with a positive risk-free rate, a 
restriction to the subclass of CRRA utility will allow for myopia (Gollier, Lindsey and Zeckhauser 
(1997)). 
5 We can assume that all agents are identical, although this assumption is not always necessary 
as is pointed out by Constandinides (1982).  4 
the risk-free asset and define the random variable % x as the final value of the risky asset, 
including all incremental cash flows.  The distribution function for % x, F, is assumed to be 
chosen from those with support in the interval  ℜ ⊂ ] , [ b a  such that Ex % > 0, where E 
denotes the expectation operator.  Let Da b
+ [ , ] denote the set of all such distribution 
functions.  The assumption Ex % > 0 ensures a positive equilibrium price.  Agents' 
preferences are assumed to be smooth in the sense of being representable by a twice-
differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u() ⋅ .6  The agent can adjust her 
portfolio via buying and selling the two assets.  Letting P represent the price of the risky 
asset and β  denote the demand for additional units of  % x, the agent solves the following 
optimization program: 
 
 ) ~ ( ~ ~ where , ) ~ ( max P x x w y y Eu − + + ≡ β
β
.     (1) 
 
The first-order condition for maximizing the agent's expected utility is 7 
 
  Ex Pu y (% )( %) − ′ = 0.         ( 2 )  
 
Since our focus is on equilibrium, we assume that (2) is satisfied with an excess demand 










.         ( 3 )  
 
  It is useful to note that (1) is essentially the standard portfolio problem and the 
solution(s) to (3) show all values of P for which there is no excess demand or supply of 
the risky asset.  
 
                                                            
6 This assumes second-order risk aversion in the sense of Segal and Spivak (1990). 
7The second-order condition follows trivially from the assumption of risk aversion.  5 
To keep the discussion relatively unencumbered, we focus solely on the price (3) 
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.        ( 4 )  
 
  As is fairly common in the finance literature, (3) can be written as 
 
  Px d x E x
a
b
=≡ ∫ η () $~,         ( 5 )  
where  η () ( ( ~)) ( ) ( ) x Eu w x u w t dF t
a
x
≡ ′ + ′ +
− ∫
1  is the so-called “risk-neutral probability 
distribution” corresponding to wx + % for the utility u, and where  $ E denotes the 
expectation operator under this distribution.  In other words, the actual equilibrium 




3. Tatônnement  Adjustment 
 
  Although our focus is not on out-of-equilibrium adjustment, some discussion of it 
is necessary for us to be able to compare equilibrium prices following a change in asset 
risk.  To this end, consider the first-order condition as given in (2), without the restriction 
that individual optima represent an equilibrium, i.e. without assuming that β *. = 0  W e  
find the slope of the demand curve at any price by examining how the optimal excess 
demand at that price, which we label β () , P  would change with a perturbation of P.  In 
particular, consider 




Eu y x P u y
2 (~)
[( ~)(~ )] (~)
∂β∂
β =− ′′ −−′ .     (6) 
 
Concavity of Eu y ( %) in β  implies that excess demand for  % x will rise or fall as the sign of 
(6) is positive or negative respectively.  Unfortunately the sign of (6) is indeterminate a 
priori.  As an example of possibly upward sloping demand, consider a case where the 
agent's preferences exhibit the commonly assumed property of decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA).   
  DARA can be completely characterized as  "− ′ ⋅ u () is a more concave utility 
function than u() ⋅ ."  As is well known,8 an individual who is more risk averse will invest 
less in the risky asset, ceteris paribus.  Thus, an individual with utility − ′ ⋅ u ( ) will invest 
less in the risky asset than someone with utility u() ⋅ .  This implies that 
dE u y d E u y x P (( %))/ [ (%)(% )] − ′ =− ′′ −< β 0 when evaluated at β () P , the optimal β  for u.  
This result shows that the derivative in (6) will be negative for positive values β , but 
might be positive if β  is negative.  That is, the risky asset might be a Giffen good at some 
price levels for which β < 0.  The intuition here is quite usual for trading an endowed 
asset.  When selling  % x (i.e. β < 0), an increase in P makes it attractive to sell more (the 
substitution effect); but this effect is mitigated by an income effect which, under DARA, 
induces a reduction in risk aversion that makes owning more  % x attractive.  Of course, if 
preferences do not satisfy DARA, other comparative statics are possible. 
  Fortunately for us, we are not concerned with the shape of the entire demand 
curve.  We need only concern ourselves with the slope of demand at the fixed (aggregate-
endowment) level of supply; that is at β = 0.  At the equilibrium price, (6) is 
unambiguously negative.  As a consequence, the excess-demand curve crosses the   
horizontal axis, β = 0, only once, from above. This implies that the equilibrium price is 
unique and stable.  Two examples of  ) (P β  are shown in Figure 1.   
                                                            
8See for example Arrow (1971) or Pratt (1964).  We should point out, however, that this result is 
not readily extendable to a model with more than two assets.  See Hart (1975).  7 
 
 
4.  Changes in Risk and Lower Asset Prices 
 
  Consider a change in the distribution of payoffs on the risky asset from F to G, 
represented by a change in random variables from  %% xx 12 to , where FG D ab ,[ , ] . ∈
+   We 
let P 1 and P 2 denote the corresponding equilibrium prices and examine restrictions on the 
distributional changes which are both necessary and sufficient for PP 12 ≥ , independent of 
the particular increasing and concave utility function of the representative agent.  In other 
words, consider the set UP () 1  of all risk-averse utility functions yielding P 1 as an 
equilibrium price.  We look at conditions on the distributional changes that guarantee that 
the new asset price is smaller, independent of the particular utility function that generated 




  8 
  Since the excess demand function β 1() P  crosses the horizontal axis exactly once 
and from above, we only need to consider conditions for which β 21 0 () P ≤ .  This would 
automatically imply PP 21 ≤ .  An example is drawn in Figure 1 for which β β 21 () () PP >  
for some out-of-equilibrium prices. 
  It is useful to note that β β 11 22 1 ( % )( % ) Ex Ex =− = , since a "fair price," PE x = %, 
induces every risk averter to fully insure, which in our model entails β =− 1.  Thus, if 
Ex Ex %% 12 = , as is the case we illustrate in Figure 1, the demand curves will intersect at this 
price.  Prices above Ex % will cause the individual to desire a short position in x ~ , i.e. 
β <− 1.  However, in our model this out-of-equilibrium condition is of no consequence, 
unless 1 ) ( 1 2 − ≤ P β .  But in such a case, whether or not we restrict short sales does not 
matter.  All that matters to us is that β 21 0 () P < . 
We are interested in determining the conditions on any distributional change in 
the payoffs that will guarantee that  1 2 P P ≤ .  Recall that payoffs are restricted to be 
contained within the interval [a, b] and are restricted to have a positive expected payoff.  
These conditions are given in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition:  Suppose that the equilibrium price of asset  ~ x1, with distribution 
FD a b ∈
+ [,] , is P 1.  Then the equilibrium price of asset % x2, with distribution 
GDa b ∈
+ [,] , will be no larger than P 1, independent of the particular concave utility 
function that generated P 1  [i.e. ∀  u∈ UP () 1 ] , if and only if ∃∈ ℜ γ  such that 
 





−≤ − ∀ ∈ ∫ ∫ 11 γ .      ( 7 )  
[Remark: When condition (7) holds for some γ ,  ~ x2  is said to be “Centrally Riskier” 
than ~ x 1 around  P 1  (see Gollier (1995))]. 
 
Proof:    9 
Since we have established the single-crossing property of the excess demand 
function, we only need to determine conditions for which 
 
  Ex Puw x Ex Puw x (~ )( ~ )( ~ )( ~ ) 11 1 21 2 00 − ′ += ⇒ − ′ +≤    (8) 
for all increasing and concave functions u.9 The first condition in (8) above expresses the 
fact that u is in UP () 1 , whereas the second condition is equivalent to β 21 0 () P < .  These 
conditions are the same as those in the standard portfolio problem under an exogenous 
change in risk, which has been examined in recent papers by Gollier (1995) and by 
Gollier and Kimball (1996).  In particular, that (7) is both necessary and sufficient for (8) 
to hold follows directly from applying Proposition 1 in Gollier (1995, p. 525) to the 
standard portfolio problem. ! 
 
Condition (7) in the Proposition above is the same as that for the standard 
portfolio problem, although the set-up of the two problems is somewhat different.  In the 
standard portfolio problem, individuals start off with a fixed wealth w ˆ  and zero risky 
asset, and choose α  to maximize Eu w x P ( $ (% )) +− α .  If we define  P w w + = ˆ , then the 
optimal portfolio demand α * is equal to β *+1 in our model, since we imbue the 
individual with one “unit” of  1
~ x  as an endowment.  At price P=P1, we obtain the 
equilibrium asset demand α *=1, or equivalently, the equilibrium excess demand of β *=0.  
Of course, if we consider asset demand in the portfolio problem with an initial risk-free 
wealth of w, rather than w+P1 , the demand for  1
~ x need not equal 1, due to an income 
effect.   
 
 
                                                            
9 It is interesting to note that, if  2
~ x is a mean-preserving increase in risk over  1
~ x , then (8) will hold 
whenever  ) ( ) (
'
1 X W U P x + − is concave in x.  Several authors have examined this sufficient 
condition on preferences.  Condition (7), which is a restriction on distributions, is both necessary 
and sufficient for the implication in (8) to hold.  10 
5.  Stochastic Dominance and Asset Prices 
 
  Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) showed that second-order stochastic dominance of 
~ x1 over  % x2 is not sufficient for β β 21 11 () () PP ≤ .  Thus, if  % x2 is riskier than % x1 in the sense 
of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), it does not necessarily follow that  ~ x1 is Centrally 
Riskier than ~ x 2 .  This emphasizes the fact that the price of a risky asset (or 
equivalently, its risk-neutralized expected value) should not be seen as always adjusting 
in tandem with its risk premium.  Second-order stochastic dominance also is not 
necessary for β β 21 11 () () PP ≤ , as is illustrated by our numerical example below.  In our 
example,  % x2 is not second-order stochastically dominated by  ~ x1, yet any risk-averse 
economy with  P 1 1 >  incurs a reduction in the equilibrium price due to this change in 
distribution.  Thus, second-order stochastic dominance is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for the equilibrium price to be affected in an unambiguous way.  The same is easily 
shown to be true for first-order stochastic dominance as well. 
 
Example: Let  w = 0 and let  ~ x1 be a discrete random variable with a payoff of 
either 0 or 3, each with an equal chance of occurrence.  Let  ~ x 2  be distributed such 
that it has three equally likely payoffs: 0, 1 or 3.  The change in risk from  ~ x1 to  ~ x 2  is 
accomplished by transferring some probability mass from the tails to an atom at x = 1.  In 
some sense the risk is reduced, but the mean is also reduced.  Thus, there is no second-
order stochastic dominance.  Suppose that we observed an equilibrium price  P 1 11 = . .  
Can one guarantee that the change in distribution of the payoffs from  ~ x1 to  ~ x 2  will 
reduce the equilibrium asset price in this economy, under the initial observation that 
P 1 11 = . ?  This is indeed the case, since condition (7) is satisfied with  P 1 11 = .  and 
γ = 23 /.   Thus,  % x2 is Centrally Riskier than  ~ x 1 around  P 1 11 = ..  
 However,  defining  ~ x1 and  ~ x 2  as in the example above does not always lead to 
PP 12 <  in cases where  P 1 11 ≠ . .  Indeed, one can show that  % x2 is not Centrally Riskier  11 
than ~ x 1 around  P 1, when  P 1 1 < .  For example, consider the piecewise linear utility 

















It is easily checked that  P 1 05 = .  in this economy, but  PP 21 47 => / .  Thus, the change 
in risk from  ~ x1 to  ~ x 2  always reduces the asset price when  P 1 11 = . , but it may 
increase the equilibrium price when  P 1 11 ≠ . .  
  We should be careful to point out that our Proposition is dependent upon the 
initial equilibrium price P1 as the above example illustrates.  Indeed, if we search for 
conditions for which the change in risk from  ~ x1 to  ~ x 2  always reduces the asset price, 
regardless of the initial price P1, then second-order stochastic dominance is necessary.10 
 
 
6.  Sufficient Increases in Risk for Lower Asset Prices 
 
  Although section 4 portrays conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for 
changes in the distribution of asset payoffs to yield a lower equilibrium price, condition 
(7) may not always be easily verifiable.  In this section, we examine whether several 
restrictions on changes in risk, each of which has appeared in previous literature, might 
be sufficient in reaching the conclusion that PP 21 ≤  in our Proposition.  Verifying (7) for 
a fixed value of γ , for example, is a much easier task.  For example, the case where  1 = γ , 
as originally examined by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), may be easily verifiable. 
  Meyer and Ormiston (1985) introduced the notion of a strong increase in risk, 
where some probability mass is taken from the initial support of the distribution of 
                                                            
10  A proof can be found in Gollier & Schlesinger (1998).  In particular, the left-hand side of (8) is 
assumed to hold in our Proposition, so that  1 P  is the equilibrium price.  12 
payoffs and is transferred outside of the convex hull of the initial support, while 
preserving the mean.11  They show that their condition is sufficient to reduce the demand 
for risky assets by any risk-averse investor.  It can be easily verified that a strong increase 
in risk is a particular case of centrally riskier shifts in distribution, in which condition (7) 
is satisfied with γ = 1.   
  The restriction of transferring the probability mass outside of the initial support, 
though trivial to verify, is quite a strong restriction, and one that might not apply in many 
real world situations.  Both Black and Bulkley (1989) and Dionne, Eeckhoudt and Gollier 
(1993) relax this notion by obtaining weaker sufficient conditions called respectively 
relatively strong increases in risk  and relatively weak increases in risk around  P 1.  These 
definitions allow for more generality in that they allow for some spreading of probability 
mass within the interior of the initial support.  However, this added generality is gained at 
a cost of more-complex conditions to verify, which involve likelihood ratios. 
  Dionne and Gollier (1992) obtain a very appealing sufficient condition called a 
simple increase in risk around  P 1 in which the two cumulative distribution functions 
must cross only once at P 1.  This condition is easy to verify and supports many nice real-
world scenarios.  It is essentially equivalent to requiring an increase in risk such that, at 
the original price  P 1, 
(i)   the expected profit remains the same 
(ii)  the odds of getting any final positive profit level or higher is increased, and 
  (iii) the odds of getting any final negative profit level or lower is increased. 
In such a case, the equilibrium price will adjust downwards.  Again, one can easily show 
that a simple increase in risk around  P 1 is a particular case of a Centrally Riskier shift in 
the distribution around  P 1, with γ = 1.   
                                                            
11  Actually, the Meyer and Ormiston result can be considered as an extension of the note by 
Eeckhoudt and Hansen (1980), who consider increases in risk that shift mass from the initial 
distribution to the two extremum of the probability support.  13 
For the set of distribution shifts satisfying first-order stochastic dominance, 
Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) obtain an unambiguous comparative static result for 
the demand of a risky asset, if the shift in distribution satisfies the well-known monotone 
likelihood ratio property.  While this property is examined often in the literature, it is 
rather restrictive.  Many first-order stochastic dominance shifts that lead to a lower asset 
price do not satisfy this property.  Moreover, this condition is sometimes difficult to 
verify.  A subset of distribution shifts satisfying the monotone likelihood ratio property 
was examined recently by Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1996).  They define distributional 
shifts such that the ratio G(t)/F(t) is nondecreasing in t as satisfying the monotone 
probability ratio criteria.  This easily verifiable condition is also sufficient for a lower 
equilibrium asset price. 
Both the monotone likelihood ratio property and the monotone probability ratio 
property have the advantage of being independent of  1 P .  In other words, they guarantee a 




7.  Background Risk and the Equity Premium Puzzle 
 
  The analysis thus far has been based within the context of a market with no 
background risk.  But, as mentioned by Mehra and Prescott (1985), some empirical 
puzzles, such as the equity premium puzzle, might be answerable if we assume that 
markets are incomplete.12  Weil (1992), for example, assumes an uninsurable 
idiosyncratic risk for each individual, due to uncertain second-period labor income, and 
shows how this type of background risk might lead to a higher equity premium.  In this 
                                                            
12  Some compelling new evidence by Jorion and Goetzmann (1999), however, shows that the 
equity premium might not be quite as high as is typically supposed.  Thus, there may be a smaller 
"puzzle" that actually needs to be rationalized by the theory.  14 
section, we present a simple extension of our own model that captures the essence of 
Weil's model.  We extend this setting in the next section to consider how a miscalibration 
of the background risk might offer some additional insight into the equity premium 
puzzle.   
  In our model, we can consider the equity premium as essentially  P x E − ~ .  Using 
empirical observations, this difference is often regarded as too high to be supported by 
realistic preferences within a representative agent model.13  In our static model, we 
achieve essentially the same effect as Weil by replacing the fixed initial wealth, w, with 
w+ ~ ε , where we assume % ε  is independent of asset payoffs and E% ε = 0.14  In this case, 
we proceed by defining the derived utility function (see Kihlstrom et al. (1991)) as 
 
  vy E uy y () ( %) ≡+ ∀ ε , 
 
where expectations are taken over the distribution of % ε .  The function v() ⋅  represents a 
well-defined von Neuman-Morgenstern utility of wealth and v inherits both monotonicity 
and risk aversion from u.  Consequently, our Proposition will hold for v as well for u; or 
put differently, conditions on changes from %% xx 12 to  that ensure PP 21 ≤ , with a fixed 
background wealth, w, will also apply when background wealth is risky, w+ % ε . 
  In applying the Proposition, however, we must caution that the equilibrium price 
itself will most surely be different in the presence of background risk.  Indeed, if P 1 
denotes the equilibrium price of  % x in a particular market economy without background 
risk, then the introduction of independent background risk % ε  can cause the equilibrium 
price to either rise or fall to some new equilibrium price, say  $ P 1.  Therefore, applying the 
Proposition to P 1 will lead to conditions for which  $ PP 21 ≤ .  In other words, we will only 
                                                            
13  For example, using the fairly common assumption of constant relative risk aversion, the level 
of relative risk aversion implied by the data typically falls at unrealistically high levels, such as 15 
or 20.  With risk aversion equaling 20, for example, a person with $100 of initial wealth would 
have a certainty equivalent of $3.42 for a 50-50 gamble between $100 and $0. 
14See Doherty and Schlesinger (1983) and Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) for discussion of the 
case where % ε and  % x  are not independent.  15 
determine whether we can guarantee that  $ () $ () ββ 21 11 PP ≤ , where $ β i denotes excess 
demand for asset  % xi in the incomplete-market economy.  This in turn will not be 
sufficient to infer whether  $ ( $ ) $ ( $ ) ββ 21 11 0 PP ≤= , and so we do not know whether  $$ PP 21 ≤ . 
  In addressing the equity-premium puzzle, we do not need to apply the Proposition 
at all.  Rather, we need only consider the effect of % ε  on the demand for the risky asset.  
Although the effect of adding % ε  is ambiguous, a priori, Weil (1992) assumes that 
preferences are not only risk averse, but also exhibit Kimball's (1993) standard risk 
aversion.  In such a case, it is simple to show that the derived utility function is more risk 
averse than u.15  Therefore, under the same risky payoff  % x1, the equilibrium price in the 
market with background risk,  $ P 1, will be less than the price in a market without 
background risk, P 1.  Since the expected payoff, Ex %1 remains unchanged, Weil argues 
that a market analyst who ignores the idiosyncratic risk % ε  (or who uses macro data to 
replace  % ε  with E% ε = 0) and calculates price P 1 will overstate the equilibrium price, or 
equivalently understate the true (empirical) equity premium.16 
 
8.  Miscalibrated Risk and the Equity Premium 
 
  The background-risk model of the previous section leads to an interesting 
extension in the context of changes in risk.  Suppose again that  % x1 and ε~ are independent 
with  E% ε = 0.  Now define  %% % xx d 21 =+ ε , where "= d" denotes "equal in distribution."  In 
                                                            
15See Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992).  Standard risk aversion is fully characterized by 
preferences exhibiting both DARA and decreasing absolute prudence, where absolute prudence 
is defined as − ′′′ ′′ uyu y () / () .  Although Weil assumes the sufficient condition of standard risk 
aversion, we know from Gollier and Pratt (1996) that the weaker condition of risk vulnerability is 
sufficient, and also necessary, for v to be more risk averse than u.  A sufficient condition for risk 
vulnerability is absolute risk aversion being decreasing and convex. 
16This manifests itself in the expected return (4) in our model.  Weil's model is a bit more 
complex, since background risk in his model also induces a change in the risk-free rate of return.  
To be sure, Kocherlakota's (1996) criticism of Weil's lack of sufficient dynamic structure applies 
even more strongly to our model.  However, Kocherlakota is not correct in claiming that 
individuals have a natural temporal hedge of the % ε  risk.  The invalidity of this argument was 
originally made by Samuelson (1963), and examined more recently by Gollier, Lindsey and 
Zeckhauser (1997).  Moreover, dynamic hedging strategies are likely to be themselves imperfect.  
See, for example, Constandinides and Duffie (1996).   16 
other words, rather than attach the "noise" term % ε  to initial wealth, we attach it here to the 
original asset distribution, represented via % x1.  Clearly  % x2 is riskier than  % x1 in the second-
degree stochastic dominance sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).  Consider final 
wealth,  %% (% ). yw x xP 22 2 2 1 =+ + − β   Considering whether there is excess demand for the 
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  We see in the above model that a change in risk from  %% % xx 11 to + ε  yields a partial 
derivative in (9) consisting of two terms.  The first term is identical to the valuation of 
dEu d / β  evaluated at β = 0 and at P 1 under the addition of an uninsurable background 
risk added to initial wealth (which in turn is equivalent to replacing u with the derived 
utility function v); exactly the case we studied in the previous section (Weil's model).  
The second term is a covariance term, which is negative due to risk aversion.  Thus, 
conditions that are sufficient to render the first term on the right-hand side of (9) 
nonpositive, will also be sufficient to render all of (9) negative.  Standard risk aversion is 
one such a condition.17 
  In Weil's (1992) background risk model, the % ε  risk was private information and 
therefore uninsurable due to observability asymmetries.  However, it appears to us that 
even if % ε  is identical for all individuals, i.e. perfectly correlated, there is also a good case 
to be made for uninsurability.   
                                                            
17See Kimball (1993) for a justification of standardness.  We should point out that all constant 
relative risk aversion utility functions, for example, are standard.  Moreover, utility satisfying a 
weak version of standardness, namely CARA utility, is sufficient for (9) to be negative.  Observe 
that the weaker condition of risk vulnerability as introduced by Gollier and Pratt (1996) is also 
sufficient to sign (9) as negative.  17 
  We thus have an extension of Weil's arguments for the equity-premium puzzle 
under miscalibrated risk:  Suppose that the market analyst examines empirical data and 
calculates a distribution function for  % x1 as F.  Obviously such a calculation is based on 
historical data, which is by necessity only a sampling distribution of the true distribution.  
If consumers all possess the same distributional information as the analyst, but consumers 
include a spurious noise term % ε  in their projected distribution, we once again have a 
model in which the analysts' projected P 1 is higher than the empirical equilibrium price, 
P 2.  This, of course, leads to a higher empirical equity premium than the analyst's 
prediction.  Hence, we have another potential explanation for the equity-premium puzzle.  
Moreover, if the same level of background risk % ε  embeds itself by attaching to % x1, rather 
than to w, the effect on the equity premium is greater than in Weil's model, the difference 
being accounted for by the extra (covariance) term on the right-hand side of equation (9). 
  Of course one might think that this conclusion is obvious: any underestimation of 
the level of "risk" will always lead to a higher equilibrium price, thus yielding a higher 
than expected equity premium.  However, as our analysis of section 5 demonstrates, if 
risk increases are in the form of a second-order stochastic-dominance deterioration, this 
conclusion is false.  Indeed, even under a change from  % x1 to  %% % xx d 21 =+ ε  , as given in this 
section, risk aversion alone is not sufficient to unambiguously conclude that PP 21 ≤ , and 




  Our main objective in this paper has been to derive necessary and sufficient 
conditions on changes in the distribution of payoffs for a risky asset that would always 
reduce the asset's equilibrium price, assuming only risk aversion on the part of 
consumers.  For example, although it is well known that second-order stochastic 
dominance is not sufficient to achieve definitive comparative statics in the standard  18 
portfolio problem, we wondered whether some attribute of economic equilibrium might 
lead to its sufficiency in determining prices.  This turned out not to be the case.  The 
relevant restriction on the change in distribution is called Central Riskiness and it is 
specific to the initial equilibrium price that has been observed.  Second order stochastic 
dominance is neither necessary nor sufficient for a Centrally Riskier shift in the 
distribution.  Since the conditions we obtained are not always easy to check, we presented 
several simple sufficient conditions for central riskiness.  These are conditions that 
currently exist in the literature and that are sufficient for signing the effect of a change in 
asset risk on the asset's equilibrium price. 
  Additionally, we examined the equity premium puzzle.  We first examined a 
simplified version Weil's model by adding a background risk to initial wealth.  We then 
attached the background risk to the initial asset-payoff distribution, rather than to initial 
wealth.  We showed how a miscalibration of risk, together with an assumption that 
preferences are standard offers a new potential explanation for empirically high equity 
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